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The Hermeneutical and Rhetorical
Nature of Law
Francis J. Mootz III
In its most venal manifestation, scholarly writing betrays the anxiety of influence by claiming to offer a radically new solution to ageold conundrums. The goal is to make a clean break from a traditional
path of thought that has become trapped in a cul-de-sac, to make
progress by finding a new way forward. Not so with Professor Jean
Porter's work, and particularly her most recent book. Porter demonstrates that thinking through an established tradition - one that has
responded to numerous challenges within very different contexts over
several millennia - can sometimes offer the most productive response
to contemporary dilemmas. She rejects the Sirens' lure to make a
sharp break from received traditions. Instead, she chooses to engage
the natural law philosophy of the early Scholastic period from our
contemporary perspective and its attendant problems. This provides
helpful resources to deal with these contemporary dilemmas, but it also
opens new possibilities for the development of natural law thinking. The
resulting book, Ministers of the Law, 1 is erudite, artfully presented, and
provocative.
In this article, I view Porter's successful resuscitation of a plausible
account of natural law through a particular lens. My thesis is that
we can productively extend her work by more strongly acknowledging
the hermeneutical and rhetorical nature of law. This may seem paradoxical, if not incoherent, in light of the common understanding that
contemporary hermeneutical and rhetorical philosophy participates
in the postmodern critique of rationality. Although many might
assume that natural law is wholly at odds with hermeneutical philosophy and rhetorical theory, I argue that the case is just the opposite.
Porter acknowledges that rhetorical persuasion is at the center of
the practices that gird the natural law tradition, but we should
Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas.
1

JEAN PoRTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAw: A NATURAL
(2010) [hereinafter PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW].
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strengthen this acknowledgment to the point of embracing fully the
theoretical commitments of contemporary hermeneutical and rhetorical theorists.
My discussion is divided into three parts. First, I survey Porter's
argument and establish that she regards hermeneutical and rhetorical practices as critical features of her natural law account. Next, I
adumbrate a hermeneutical-rh etorical understanding of natural law
that builds on my previous work. Finally, I explore how this account
expands and deepens Porter's natural law account of legal authority.
I conclude that we should recognize law's hermeneutical and rhetorical nature, but that Porter has demonstrated the necessity of taking
into account the Scholastics' natural law philosophy as part of this
project.
1. The Role of Rhetoric in Porter's Natural Law Account

Porter begins Ministers of the Law by acknowledging that the
ascendency of legal positivism has posed a seemingly intractable
problem for contemporary jurisprudence: if we must separate the
social fact of law from moral considerations about how we should act,
it seems impossible to gain critical traction in assessing the conventional practices of the legal system. She turns to an unlikely source to
respond to this familiar intellectual crisis: the natural law tradition
as articulated by the early Scholastic thinkers. It is a commonplace
that natural law was consigned to the dust heap of history after
H.L.A. Hart defeated Lon Fuller's minimalist natural law account in
their famous debate in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. Natural
law is the old answer that failed, many would argue, and not an
appropriate resource for fashioning a new answer. But these critics
would be wrong.
In the face of profound social, economic and political dislocation, the
early Scholastics sought to articulate a critical basis from which to
assess the nascent legal structures that were emerging to bring order
to social life. 2 As law became formalized through institutions rather
than existing as an organic aspect of society or as the command of an
all-powerful sovereign, there was a felt need to articulate the limits of
3
power through notions such as due process. They argued that we may
assess legal institutions against the baseline of the purpose of law: the
2

3

I d. at 42-43.
ld. at 51-52.
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promotio n and facilitati on of the natural forms of human flourishin g.•
This natural baseline is real yet underdet ermined. Caricatu res of natural law assume that a "fairly specific set of precepts" is available to
humans, but the early Scholasti cs identifie d natural law "in the primary sense with capacitie s or general principle s for rational judgmen t,
which must be exercised or specified in more or less continge nt ways in
order to be practical ly effective." 5 Although some theologic al critics may
argue that this approach to natural law is too beholden to mere social
conventio ns, the early Scholasti cs believed that "the intelligib le natural
structure s of the human organism and human life" are sufficien tly
strong that they "do have a normativ e purchase on human conduct and
the laws regulatin g that conduct." 6 Hence the title of Porter's book:
judges are constrain ed by law, and are to be regarded as "ministe rs of
the law." 7
Porter demonst rates that the early Scholasti cs believed that the general constrain ts of the natural law could be expresse d through a variety
of conventi onal forms, and so respect for the natural law can, and must,
be sensitive to the cultural context of its applicati on.

4

In an earlier work Porter emphasize d the distinction between human nature and
the manifestat ions of human nature through social structures as the key feature of

natural law thinking. JEAN PoRTER, NATURE AS REASON: A THoMISTIC THEoRY OF THE NATULAw 11 (2005) [hereinafte r PoRTER, NATURE AS REASON].
5 PoRTER, MINISTERS
OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 61. Porter notes that the early

RAL

Scholastics interpreted St. Paul's famous phrase that all persons may know the law
because it is "written on their hearts" to mean that the natural law is a capacity. See id.
at 77. "Now for the first time, the natural law is identified directly with a subjective
faculty of reason rather than with an objective normative order discerned through
reason." Id. at 78.
6 ld. at 61-62; see
also id. at 68.
7

Porter succinctly makes this point in historical terms:

Roman jurists had of course acknowledg ed the existence of a natural law, but for them the
natural law was associated with the pre-rational , organic aspects of human existence, and as
such it had little or no direct legal force. The scholastics, in contrast, developed ancient
classical and Christian perspectives on the natural law into a natural law jurisprudenc e,
yielding an account of natural rights and relations that the lawgiver is bound to respect. They
did not hold that the lawgiver can derive a comprehens ive system of laws directly from
natural law (or for that matter, from revealed divine law): from the time of Irnerius and
Gratian forward, they are keenly aware that legal enactments must be formulated and
promulgated by an authoritativ e act of will. Nonetheless , legislative authority operated
within boundaries for them. By the same token, the authority of the courts was likewise
limited by natural law principles, developed in this context into doctrines of due process. The
judge was, in their view, a "minister of the law," someone whose actions were not, so to say, his
own individual acts, but actions of the law itself.
!d. at 48 (footnote omitted).
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There is no unchanging formal law in the heavens, not even hidden in the mind of
God. Rather, to the extent that the eternal law can be said to govern human affairs,
it does so through the natural law, which is in turn specified through individual
and communal processes of practical deliberation and free choice. At the same time,
these processes are themselves constrained -by norms of reasonablene ss, by the
contingent yet practically irreversible determinations shaping an ongoing common
life, and by consideration s of natural right and equity which can be justified as such
through processes of rhetorical persuasion, even in the absence of any extensive
8
framework of shared beliefs and practices.

That is to say, rather than regarding social convention s as more or
less direct and unchangea ble expression s of human nature, they
emphasize the need for processes of rational, communal ly shared deliberation, in order to move from natural principles to their convention al
formulatio ns. 9
This perspectiv e avoids the perennial criticism that natural law is
disproved empirically by the fact that there are diverse and contradictory cultural practices throughou t the world. A broad diversity of practices, even of foundation al legal practices, is consistent with the
existence of human nature. "Indeed, a general conception of human
nature is not only compatible with the reality of irreducible cultural
diversity- we can only recognize this diversity for what it is, and begin
to make sense of it, because we presuppos e a general conception of
human nature." 10
The important question, of course, is how we can articulate the natural forms of human flourishing in a manner that is consistent with our
ability to express these forms through a variety of different conventional practices. Porter turns to cultural psychology to explain how
there is something that we might consider a core human nature, even
11
if this nature may be expressed and fulfilled in many different ways.
Contempo rary biology teaches that other animals and plants have a
fixed telos of developme nt that is stable enough to serve as a measure
of developme ntal defects, but humans use reason to discern and to
pursue their ends such that there is a whole12range of life plans that
follow from a general conception of the good. Consistent with these
modern scientific insights, the early Scholastics provide the basis from

8

Id. at 344.
See PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 81.
10
Id. at 107.
11
See id. at 110-13.
12
See id. at 102-03. Porter provides a much more detailed analysis of this point in
Nature as Reason. See PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 4, at 82-103.
9
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which to build a plausible natural law account that has purchase on
contempor ary debates without pretending to resolve these debates
definitivel y for all time.
Given these limitations) can a natural law analysis offer any second-order normative judgments, on the basis of which to evaluate and perhaps to reform specific
ways oflife-our own, or (more problematica lly) those of other societies? ... I am a
value pluralist-I do not believe that there is a basis on which to decisively resolve
every normative conflict, even--espec ially!-those concerned with fundamental
issues. Ethical systems will remain to some degree ineradicably, incommensu rably
different, whatever progress we make toward shared values and normative commitments. And yet we have good reason to believe that we can make progress, both
in self-critique and agreement on some norms of practice with those who disagree
with us on matters of fundamental importance.
In earlier work, I argued that the natural law, properly understood, generates
substantive norms in the form of ideals of virtue and broad categories of harm.
These are not sufficiently determinate to secure agreement at the level of concrete
norms, but neither are they purely formal. At least, they have enough substantive
content to provide a basis on which to engage in processes of rational self-scrutiny
and persuasive advocacy. 13

Porter suggests that the burning social issue of authorizin g same-sex
marriage is a case-in-po int of the natural law at work. The public
debate centers on the role of marriage in human flourishing , and there
is no logically compelling answer to be drawn from the varied, subtle
and historically -evolving purposes of this legal, social and religious
convention . 14
Porter emphasize s in her natural law account that it is necessary for
communiti es to engage in dialogue oriented toward persuasion regarding the appropriat e contours of the contingent forms of human practices
that should be sustained and developed to facilitate human flourishing .
This is not a concession to our fallen state as flawed and sinful, but
rather a celebration of man's distinctive character as a rational being.
The necessity of deliberatio n is what separates human nature from the
natural world; our deliberativ e capacity is our human nature. Porter
appropriat ely emphasize s this point:
In contrast with non-rational creatures, we cannot attain natural perfection
through the spontaneous unfolding and development of innate inclinations. In
order to count as rational, our acts must be elicited and informed by an intelligent
grasp of the end we seek, considered as in some way desirable and worth pursuing,

13
14

PoRTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAw, supra

See id. at 122-24.

note 1, at 113 (footnote omitted).
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together with some deliberative judgment to the effect that we can attain this end
15
through the exercise of our causal powers.

Returnin g to the question of gay marriage , Porter conclude s that
the debate about same-sex marriage is - or should be - a process "of
rational self-scru tiny and persuasiv e advocacy" in an effort to translate
the virtues develope d in a society to address specific continge nt questions of social ordering through the recogniti on and promotio n of cer16
tain family structure s. It is illegitim ate to quell this debate by
pronounc ing that marriage is, and always must be, the union of one
rs of same-sex marriage
man and one woman, because the supporte
17
make plausible (and, for Porter, persuasiv e ) claims that this practice
promotes human flourishi ng, both individu al and social.
We bring practical reasonin g to bear on moral question s through
rhetorica l persuasio n. Natural law is universa l, but the high degree of
continge ncy means that general "ideals and norms must be formulat ed
through processe s of commun al discernm ent and mutual persuasi on
18
before they can be appropri ated and put into practice by individua ls."
Rhetoric and public deliberat ion are necessar y because there is no
compelli ng reason to choose one option rather than another in this
realm, 19 and this in turn implies an obligatio n to respect differing
viewpoin ts. 20 Porter emphasiz es the necessar ily social characte r of
the effort to concretiz e natural law principle s in continge nt forms of
life, an effort that works from - and also works toward - a shared
understa nding.
The rational principles of natural law must be specified in order to be put into
practice, and yet these specifications cannot be left to individual judgments; they

15

ld. at 94.
Id. at 113.
17
Porter reasons as follows:
16

I think we should be very hesitant to rule out unconventio nal forms of marriage too quickly on
the grounds that these are contrary to the natural purposes of the institution. What seems
from one perspective to be contrary to natural purposes might appear on longer experience as

a legitimate expansion of those purposes, which does not undermine, and may well
strengthen, the central purposes which the institution must serve if society is to continue at
all. For this reason, I would support the legal recognition of sameMsex unions as marriages,
and I would grant legal recognition to some forms of plural marriages as well.

Id. at287.
18
Id. at 98; see also 169-75, 285.
19

PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE

20

Id. at 196.

LAw, supra note

1,

at 189.
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must be generally accepted in order to provide a framework for social activities, and
that means at least that they must be public and relatively stable. 21

This is precisely the positive effect of a well-ordered legal system: it
provides the necessarily social venue in which to articulate principles
that serve as the touchstones for members of the society to engage in
reflection and critique.
Porter argues that law is not just a system of sanctions against bad
behavior, but instead is the positive means by which values and norms
are socially generated. 22 The Enlightenment prejudice is that individuals may rationally discern moral and ethical principles, but this is
fundamentally at odds with the sociality of human beings. As Porter
explains,
[b]y no means would I deny that an individual can and should arrive at his own
independent judgments with respect to these matters, but even so, rational deliberation of this kind will inevitably presuppose that the individual has been formed
in normative categories mediated by his society. He may well transform or even
reject the ideals of his society, but without some ordering structure of social norms,
he would not be able even to begin an effective process of practical reasoning. 23

She connects this social dimension with the necessity of rhetorical
exchange.
This line of analysis confirms Cicero's claim that the common good of a particular
community, subjectively understood in terms of its idealized sense of the values
embodied in a particular way oflife, constitutes it as a true republic, a polity within
which free men and women can join together in shared deliberation, fruitful
debate, and communal activities of all kinds. 24

Rhetoric is a product of the social nature of our existence, but it also
is the means by which our social existence is defined, maintained and
extended.
Porter explains how rhetoric and natural law mutually implicate each
other by linking the existence of shared agreement with elaboration
through debate:
The processes of persuasion and deliberation presuppose at least some consensus
of beliefs and commitments, without which genuine disagreement and debate are
21

ld. at 81.
Id. at 143·44.
23
ld. at 138.
22

24

PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW,

supra note 1, at 161.
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impossible. Ultimately, this consensus is rooted in the claims of a shared humanity, as expressed in the first principles of the natural law. But shared humanity
and the natural law are only given concrete meaning and efficacious force in and
through their active appropriation into a specific way of life, including the polit25
ical processes of deliberation and persuasion.

Natural law is the shared basis that always is insufficient to provide
guidance in specific cases, causing the need for rhetorical specification
of a form of life appropriate to the community at that time.
Broadening the scope of discussion to the theological account that
underwrites natural law, we may recognize the realm of rhetoric as
the space in which we exercise free will. Porter emphasizes that
precisely because human deliberation and action are grounded in God's eternity,
our formal legal systems and normative practices do not need to imitate the universality and necessity of God's law, nor do we need to save ourselves from the
ambiguities of our own laws. We are free to be creatures in a finite world and to
conduct our affairs accordingly. 26

God's eternal (and, therefore, inaccessible to us) law anchors the naturallaw without any practical effect on the articulation of its contingent
expressions. Nevertheless, natural law principles provide sufficient
constraint on social deliberation to guide the effort to create contingent
social practices and institutions in the face of diverse and incommensurable considerations. Porter writes that in
our ongoing efforts to assess and to reform our own social conventions, we as a
society will inevitably find ourselves making (at least) partially contingent judgments regarding the relative urgency, significance, and concrete realization of
diverse natural purposes, seen in the context of the complex affairs of human
life. These processes of comparative assessment and formulation, in turn, presuppose some more comprehensive judgment regarding central ideals and the
bounds of acceptable behavior, in order to provide a basis for ranking these
diverse values and expressing them within a set of acceptable parameters. This

25
26

Id. at 219.
I d. at 6. Porter makes this point forcefully near the end of her book:

There is no unchanging formal law in the heavens, not even hidden in the mind of God.
Rather, to the extent that the eternal law can be said to govern human affairs, it does so
through the natural law, which is in turn specified through individual and communal processes of practical deliberation and free choice. At the same time, these processes are themselves constrained- by norms of reasonableness, by the contingent yet practically irreversible
determinations shaping an ongoing common life, and by considerations of natural right and
equity which can be justified as such through processes of rhetorical persuasion, even in the
absence of any extensive framework of shared beliefs and practices.

Id. at344.
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is tantamount to saying that deliberative processes presuppose some overall
conception of what it means to live a good human life, a life worthy of the kinds
of creatures that we are, within bounds set by our commitments to ourselves and
to one another. To the extent that we presuppose such an ideal, we will find
ourselves articulating it through the processes of assessment and reform of our
major social conventions. And to the extent that we lack such an ideal, we will
need to develop one, in order to continue deliberating in a principled, reasonable

way.27

Appeals to human nature at this level will not help us decide among these
alternatives, because what they have in common is precisely their status as
expressions of our shared nature. Thus, as John Kekes argues, human nature
underdetermines moral norms, at least at a level sufficiently concrete to be put
into practice. At best, we might be able to formulate general principles expressing
these natural patterns of behavior, but if these are to be at all plausible as
expressions of universal tendencies, they will necessarily be too broad to serve
as moral principles, without further - necessarily particular and contentious specification. 28

In order to be effective in a genuinely political rhetoric, .appeals to civic and individual virtue must be tethered to what are recognizably expressions and appropriate developments of fundamental human capacities and inclinations. But these
capacities can be developed and brought together in more than one way, not all of
them compatible with one another, and not all of them possible in every social
arrangement. The same observations apply to the individual virtues correlative to
these political ideals. 29

And so, the eternal law both grounds and compels the exercise of
human freedom, while the natural law provides sufficient guidance for
the underdetermined exercise of this freedom through rhetorical practices of persuasion and communal self-definition.

2. A Hermeneutical- Rhetorical Understanding of Natural Law30
Porter places substantial reliance on rhetorical advocacy and hermeneutical discernment as social activities by which we fashion a
contingent political order in which the virtues may be developed in
27

28

Id. at 128.

supra note 4, at 126.
supra note 1, at 201.
30
The remainder of this paper builds on, and takes from, several other works by the
author, including: Perelman's Theory of Argumentation and Natural Law, 43 PHIL. AND
RHETORIC 383-402 (2010); Symposium, Faithful Hermeneutics, MICH. Sr. L. REV. 361-76
(2009); After Natural Law: A Hermeneutic Response to Law's Quandary, 9 RUTGERS J.L.
& RELIGION (Number 2, 2008); Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal Argumentation and the Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311-82 (1999); Natural Law and the Cultivation of Legal Rhetoric, in REDISCOVERING FULLER: IMPLICIT LAw
AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Willem J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg eds., 1999).
29

PoRTER, NATURE AS REASON,

PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW,

------~·
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accord with natural law principles. In this section of the article, I
extend Porter's point and argue that the natural law must be understood within the theoretical framework established by contemporar y
hermeneutic al and rhetorical philosophy. The hermeneutica l and
rhetorical turn in contemporary jurisprudenc e has replaced the homage to universal and eternal principles with attention to the fluidity
and historical contingency of meaning. The natural law tradition
appears to be hopelessly anachronistic in the brave new world of
postmodern legal theory, in which law is constrained neither by an
objective moral order of nature nor by the logical rigor of conceptual
analysis and sociological description. However, Porter's work admirably advances the connections between the natural law and persuasion in public discourse, bringing together these seemingly disparate
traditions. I wish to radicalize Porter's insights in line with my own
work, while also acknowledgin g that her insights help to shape
my conception of a hermeneutica l and rhetorical conception of natural law.
A Philosophica l Hermeneutic s and Rhetorical Theory

I begin by explaining what I mean by the terms hermeneutic al and
rhetorical, since these longstanding intellectual traditions are complex and evolving. I endorse the philosophical hermeneutics articulated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, in which he offers a phenomenolo gy of
human understandin g rather than a method for interpreting texts.
Gadamer argues that understandin g occurs when a person brings
her finite and prejudiced horizon of preunderstan dings into dialogue
with a text that itself has a ''history of effects" within the culture that
shapes its reception. The interpreter never comes to an interpretive
event as a neutral observer, but rather is always an interested party
posing a question that is itself shaped by the cultural context created,
in part, by the text. Understandi ng is a fusion of these horizons
that only appear to be wholly distinct from each other, but which
in fact share fundamental commonalitie s established through the
linguisticalit y of human experience. Understandi ng is always an act
of application rather than simply a matter of recovery. It is an activ~
ity in which the horizon of the text is brought into dialogue with the
interpreter's horizon, such that neither remains unchanged as a
result of this experience.
Gadamer's phenomenolo gical account of hermeneutic al experience
draws upon the familiar experience of a conversation , in which understanding occurs as the product of the give-and-tak e experiences of the

--------------------
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interpreter within a given historical and social situation. 31 This leads
Gadamer to conclude that "putting at risk" is the guiding normative
implication of his philosophy. He emphasizes that "hermeneutic philosophy understands itself not as an absolute position but as a way of
experience. It insists that there is no higher principle than holding
oneself open in a conversation."32 Georgia Warnke argues that this
normative principle underwrites a new approach to the problem of
justice. Abandoning the fiction of a consensual social contract as the
source of political legitimation, she promotes a hermeneutical account
of justice as the "fair and equal hermeneutic discussion" that accepts
the reality of "disagreements between equally well justified interpretations" of the substantive requirements of a just society. 33 It is important
not to misread Warnke as conceding an "anything goes" relativism.
Warnke emphasizes that even if many interpretations can equally be
justified on formal grounds, we should not abandon the goal of coming
to an understanding in social discourse that one interpretation is better
than the others for present purposes, even if that judgment cannot be
compelled under formal logic or attributed to a (hypothetical) consensus
of all rational persons. The key hermeneutic insight is that the better
interpretation is always advanced in a contextual and historical dialogue with others, and therefore can never achieve the status of a
timeless logical truth that can be apprehended by a single individual
through the exercise ofreason.
The legal system- which is premised on the production and interpretation of authoritative texts as sources of governing authority -is the
31

Gadamer writes:

Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to every true
conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view as
valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that he understands not the
particular individual but what he says .... [When interpreting a text] the interpreter's own
horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or enforces, but more
as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one
truly to make one's own what the text says.

We can now see that this is what takes place in conversation, in which something is expressed
that is not only mine or my author's but common.

HANs-GEORGE GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 385, 388 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald
Marshall rev. trans., New York: Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) [hereinafter GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD].
32 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHiPS: ON THE ORIGINS OF PHILOSOPHICAL
33

HERMENEUTICS 189 (Robert K. Sullivan trans., MIT Press 1985) (1977).
GEORGIA WARNKE, JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION 12, viii (1993).
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most prominent venue today for this hermeneutical experience oriented
toward questions of justice. Gadamer insists that every attempt to
understand a legal text is a function of applying the text to the case at
hand, and therefore legal reasoning provides a particularly vivid model
of all hermeneutical activity. 34 He rejects the scientific impulse to reduce law to a disciplined methodology of deductive subsumption of
specific cases under general principles, recognizing the impossibility of
bridging the chasm between the presumed universal and timeless
meaning of the text and the practical demand of resolving the dispute
at hand. The model of conversation proves to be especially illuminating
in this context: an interpreter understands a legal text by suppressing
her subjective designs and allowing the texts to speak to the question
posed by the case. The model of conversation also underscores the rhetorical nature of legal practice: An interpreter can understand a text
best by suppressing the urge to chart the line of inquiry in advance, just
as a rhetorician must be attuned to her audience. The interpreter does
not adopt a subjective attitude of dominance over the text, but rather
suppresses her subjective aims and attends to the unfolding meaning of
the historically effective text as it is revealed in the present circumstances. Law is authoritative because it is the hermeneutically-sound
practice of appropriating governing texts to current disputes.
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics underwrites the practical discourse described by Porter in which members of a community bring the
natural law to bear through the development and maintenance of historically contingent practices. Hermeneutical discernment is inevitable, but it also always underdetermines the instantiation of natural
law principles in a given society. As Porter repeatedly emphasizes,
members of society must engage in persuasive discourse to foster and
elaborate the normative contours of the social world in which practical
decisions about morality are made. There is no natural law truth that
stands outside this discourse and provides a unique answer to concrete
moral problems that arise, just as there is no invariant meaning of a
text that may be retrieved independently of the social circumstances in
which the interpretation takes place.
The continuity with Porter's argument is underscored by recognizing
the deep affinities of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics with contemporary rhetorical theory. Chai:m Perelman's development of a "new
rhetoric" provides an important link between Gadamer's phenomenology of understanding and the concrete ways in which people pursue
34

GADMiER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 31, at 324-41.
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questions of justice in everyday life. Perelman demonstrated in his first
book that arguments about the dictates of justice could not be rational
since they did not accord with formal logic. Confronted by this bizarre
yet inescapable conclusion, Perelman rejected the Cartesian philosophical tradition from which it issued and set for himself the task of
identifying the means by which it is possible to secure adherence to
35
reasonable claims regarding the requirements of justice.
Working from Aristotle's rhetorical philosophy, Perelman argues
that it is necessary to distinguish rational truths from reasonable
arguments. The existence of competing arguments does not necessarily
mean that at least one of the participants has engaged in defective
thinking or that the matter admits only of irrational adherence. Perelman demonstrates that argumentation has its own logic that can foster
reasonable action even in the face of a case that is undecidable under
Cartesian strictures of rationality. As a prime example, Perelman
points to the operation of the legal system in which arguments are
made and action is taken despite the inevitable lack of indubitable
36
knowledge about the questions raised by the dispute. He argues that
philosophers can gain insight into the nature of moral argumentation
by looking to the practical engagement that occurs in legal argumentation rather than to an abstract model of theory as a guide.
[T]he diverse principles which the philosophers have presented as supreme norms
in ethics are in reality only commonplaces, in the meaning of classical rhetoric, that
they give reasons which are to be considered in each concrete situation rather than
as axioms like those of geometry whose consequences can be drawn by simple
deduction. Practical reasoning, applicable in morality, must not be inspired by the
mathematical model, which is not applicable in changing circumstances, but by a
35

CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES: EsSAYS ON RHETORIC AND ITS

APPLICATIONS 112 (William Kluback eta!., trans., D. Reidel Publishing 1979) [hereinafter
PERELMAN, THE NEw RHETORIC]; see also Edgar Bodenheimer, Perelman's Contribution to
Legal Methodology, 12 N. KY. L. REv. 391, 398·404 (1985).
36
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129 (John Petrie et a!., trans., D. Reidel Publishing 1980) [hereinafter PERELMAN, Jus.
TICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT]. Perelman joins Gadamer in regarding legal argumentation as
a model for philosophical inquiry-particularly moral philosophy-and therefore looks to
the social practice oflegal argumentation to derive important theoretical insights.
After having sought, for centuries, to model philosophy on the sciences, and having considered each of its particularities as a sign of inferiority, perhaps the moment has come to
consider that philosophy has many traits in common with law. A confrontation with the latter
would permit better understanding of the specificity of philosophy, a discipline which is
elaborated under the aegis of reason, but a reason which is essentially practical, turned
toward rational decision and action.
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knowledge characterized by reasonableness and by the taking into consideration
diverse aspirations and multiple interests, defined by Aristotle as phronesis or
prudence, and which is so brilliantly manifested in law, in Roman jurisprudentia.

If law has suffered much from being too influenced by the sciences, I believe the
same reproach can be addressed to philosophy . . . . If the new concept of law
spreads, which is basically a very old one, and which has been forgotten for centuries, philosophers will have much to learn from it. They will look to the techniques
of the jurist to learn how to reason about values, how to realize an equilibrium, how
to bring about a synthesis ofvalues. 37

The new rhetoric essentially is a philosophy about how argumentation
can be reasonable. 38
Perelman's rhetorical philosophy is distinctly at odds with the
account of natural law philosophy as the discovery of abiding truths
that have normative force in the absence of argumentation. It should
come as no surprise, then, that Perelman roundly criticizes the natural
law tradition. 39 He emphasizes that the traditional approach to natural
law continually runs aground on the shoals of experience, as demonstrated by the fact that reason has failed to settle debates regarding
justice that reach back at least as far as Sophocles. 40 He concludes that
justice is not univocal; instead, it always requires making choices
between justifiable tenets that are in conflict. Law must operate in the
realm of the reasonable as well as the rational if it is to do justice.
Nevertheless, Perelman's philosophy is deeply indebted to Aristotle,
and Perelman recognizes that there may be room for a very different
understanding of natural law by drawing on Aristotle. Aristotle offers a
counterpoint to modern rationalist conceptions of natural law because
he was too wedded to the necessity of an equitable leavening of the
law to endorse a thoroughly rationalized approach to legal practice. In
a seminar Perelman summarized his conclusion: "I don't see either
Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas saying as Grotius says, that there are
37

ld. at 119, 146; see also Alan H. Goldman, Legal Reasoning as a Model for Moral
Reasoning, 8 LAW & PHIL. 131, 139 (1989) ("Moral reasoning, despite a difference in the
data base, shares the structure of legal reasoning.").
38
To reason with another person "is not merely to verify and demonstrate, but also to
deliberate, to criticize and to justifY, to give reasons for and against-in a word, to
argue." PERELMAN, JusTICE, LAw, AND ARGUMENT, supra note 36, at 59.
39
Perelman rejects the secular, rationalist incarnation of the natural law tradition
because it presumes that reason can determine not only what is true in the world of
empirical fact, but also what is just in the social world. See id. at 29-32, 42-43, 131.
40
Id. at 163-66.
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eternal laws of justice, just as eternal as the laws of mathematics. It is
impossible."41 Perelman recognizes that classical approaches to natural
law might supplement his rhetorical philosophy by carefully attending
to the interplay between the hypothesized rational legal system and the
reasonable resolution of specific cases.
It is immediately apparent that Perelman's rhetorical philosophy
extends Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics in a manner that
recalls Porter's emphasis on the need for hermeneutical discernment
and rhetorical elaboration of the natural law in specific social contexts.
But whereas Porter begins with a natural law account and then grants
substantial importance to the role of hermeneutics and rhetoric in practice, Gadamer and Perelman provide an ontological account of the hermeneutical and rhetorical nature of human understanding. I join their
effort and argue that we ought to conceive of natural law as naturalized
rhetoric, by which I mean that the manner in which we engage in legal
regulation and moral deliberation is rooted in our human nature as
interpretive and rhetorical beings.

B. Natural Law as Naturalized Rhetoric
Gadamer is one of the leading philosophers of the anti-foundationa list
movement during the last century that located all understanding in the
hermeneutical-rh etorical experience of finite beings. It might be surprising, then, to learn that at a critical juncture of Truth and Method
he endorses Aristotle's classical account of a "changing'' natural law.
For Aristotle, this changeability [the fact that natural law is not timeless and
unchanging] is wholly compatible with the fact that it is "natural" law.... [Unlike,
for example, traffic regnlations, there are] things that do not admit of regnlation by
mere human convention because the "nature of the thing" constantly asserts itself.

Thus it is quite legitimate to call such things ''natural law." In that the nature of the
thing still allows some room for play, natural law is still changeable.... [Aristotle]
quite clearly explains that the best state "is everywhere one and the same," but it is
the same in a different way that "fire burns everywhere in the same way, whether in
Greece or Persia."

... [Aristotle's natural laws] are not norms to be found in the stars, nor do they
have an unchanging place in a natural moral universe, so that all that would be
necessary would be to perceive them. Nor are they mere conventions, but really do

41
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correspond to the nature of the thing-except that the latter is always itself determined in each case [contextually] . ... 42

At first, the claim that "the nature of the thing still allows some room
for play" appears to be a wholesale surrender of natural law principles
to the interpretive turn, but he wishes to emphasize just the opposite in
his reading of Aristotle.
If I am not mistaken, Aristotle was quite clear about this when he aScribed an
exclusively critical function to the idea of natural law rather than a positive,
dogmatic one. It has always been felt to be shocking (when it was not denied
outright, by misinterpreting Aristotle's text) that he distinguishes between conventional and natural law, yet goes on to claim that natural law can be
changed.

Natural law and law established by statute are not "equally changeable." Rather,
by considering comparable phenomena it is explained that even what is just by
nature is changeable, without on that account ceasing to be different from that
which is established by mere statute. Obviously traffic regulations, for example,
are not changeable to the same but to a much higher degree than something
naturally just. Aristotle seeks not to detract from this view but to explain how to
distinguish what is naturally just in the unstable human world (in contrast to
that of the gods). Thus he says that the distinction between what is naturally
right and what is legal or conventional is evident - despite the changeability of
both- as the distinction between the right hand and the left. There too by nature
the right is the stronger, and yet this natural priority cannot be described as
unchangeable, since, within limits, it can be removed by training the other
hand. 43

This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that natural law is experienced
only by virtue of the bounded flexibility experienced in interpretation,
which always is an application and adjustment to context. 44
Significantly, Gadamer extends the scope of his analysis beyond law
and politics and applies it to all moral knowledge. Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the idea that moral knowledge exists independently
of contextual efforts to live correctly, that moral ends can be discovered and then pursued as preestablished goals by utilizing appropriate means. Gadamer emphasizes this point by refining Heidegger's
creative reading of Aristotle's terminology: Morality is never just a
matter of techne - a learned skill such as carpentry that pursues
known ends - but rather is a matter of praxis that exhibits phronesis
attentive to chairos - a practical judgment rendered within a given
42
43

GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD,

Id. at 519.
44
Id. at 519-20.

supra note 31, at 319-20.
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situation concerning the appropriate course of action at45 that time.
Thus, morality simultaneous ly is an end and a means. Gadamer
insists that we
do not possess moral knowledge in such a way that we already have it and then
apply it to specific situations . ... What is right, for example, cannot be fully
determined independently of the situation that requires a right action from me,
whereas the eidos of what a craftsman wants to make is fully determined by the use
46
for which it is intended.

Although the natural law - both in terms of moral knowledge and
legal correctness - is known only contextually and historically,
Gadamer insists that it is appropriate to regard it as natural law
when that term is understood in its classical sense as articulated by
Aristotle. This is why he denies that the interpreter may validly
impose an interpretatio n or moral judgment as a manifestation of
subjective will: there is something in "the nature of the thing" that
prevents such hubris.
Perelman proceeds from this same ontological commitment, but he
focuses on the rhetorical means by which the "changeable" natural law
is established, utilized, and refined. In a manner that echoes Gadamer,
Perelman insists that the natural law tradition can embrace the ontological pluralism of legal argumentatio n without degenerating into a
formless relativism:
The idea of natural law is also misconceived when it is posed in ontological
terms . ... Natural law is better considered as a body of general principles or
loci, consisting of ideas such as "the nature of things," ('the rule of law," and of
rules such as "No one is expected to perform impossibilities," "Both sides should
be heard" - all of which are capable of being applied in different ways. It is the
task of the legislator or judge to decide which of the not unreasonable solutions
should· become a rule of positive law. Such a view, according to Michel Villey,
corresponds to the idea of natural law found in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas
47
-what he calls the classical naturallaw

This quotation is potentially misleading, inasmuch as it suggests that
natural law is 'just" a line of argument and has no "ontological" status.
Perelman is best read as advancing a naturalized rhetoric that connects
Gadamer's ontological claims with the argumentativ e practices of law
and moral decision making.

45

I d. at 316-22.
ld. at 317 (emphasis added).
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In a recent article I have delineated three ways in which Perelman's
theory of argumentation connects to natural law philosophy. 48 As
revealed in the quotation above, it is certainly true that Perelman
regarded natural law as a commonplace oflegal and moral argumentation. He cites the decision by the Allies to justify the Nuremberg trials
with appeals to natural law as a concession to the fact that the demands
of justice require reasoning that extends beyond application of conventional positive law. 49 Perelman rejects the authoritarian and ideological
overtones of the natural law tradition, but he argues that the tradition
is not a "mistake" that should-or can-be exorcised from our vocabulary.
If natural law is an ontological feature of the world, it must be the case
that when both parties in a debate invoke natural law one of them must
be wrong. However, when natural law is understood as a commonplace
from which one may argue many points in different ways, we see that
natural law is a supple and polysemic concept that does not yield singular answers to social and legal disputes. In short, Perelman strips natural law precepts of their inauthentic claims to eternal and universal
validity and urges legal theorists and practitioners to utilize the principles as vital (indeed, unavoidable) resources for introducing innovation
and for critiquing existing legal relations. 50
Regarding the natural law as a rhetorical commonplace may be
descriptively accurate, but this does not grant natural law principles
any more status than mere maxims of the law. I argue that Perelman's
argumentation theory connects with the natural law tradition in at
least two additional, more substantive, ways. First, we can connect
Perelman's contested (and often misunderstood) idea of a "universal
audience" to the natural law tradition. Second, we can think of natural
48

See Francis J. Mootz III, Perelman's Theory ofArgumentation and Natural Law, 43
383 (2010).
PERELMAN, THE NEw RHETORIC, supra note 35, at 104.
50
Steven Smith has pronounced the inevitability of natural law argumentation as
"law's quandary" because "modern legal discourse is operating in a sort of 'ontological
gap' that divides our explicit or owned ontological commitments" - essentially, legal
positivism -"from the ontological assumptions not only implicit in but essential to our
discourse and practice" - essentially, natural law principles. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAw's
QUANDARY 63 (2004). Put more simply, our quandary is that legal discourse depends
upon something analogous to the religious ontology of natural law, but we expressly
disavow such an ontological grounding despite the necessary role it plays in our practices. Similar to my tack in this article, I contend that we can find a natural law solution
to law's quandary in the account offered by contemporary rhetorical and hermeneutical
philosophy, which is very different from the traditional natural law accounts toward
which Smith gestures, but which no longer are persuasive. Francis J. Mootz III, After
Natural Law: A Hermeneutical Response to Law's Quandary, 9 RUTGERS J.L & RELIGION
1 (2008).
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law in more far-reaching theoretical terms by conceiving Perelman's
philosophy as propounding a "naturalized rhetoric."
Perelman famously recuperated the ancient attention to audience,
but he placed emphasis on the speaker's active creation of the audience
in the course of addressing it. 51 In some circumstances, a speaker will
aspire to more than persuading the audience to which the speech is
immediately directed and will claim to offer reasons that would be
convincing to all reasonable persons. "This refers of course, in this case,
not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of an audience which
should be universal, since, for legitimate reasons, we need not take into
consideration those [who] are not part of it." 52 Rhetors construct a
universal audience not only to shape their discourse but also to entreat
the concrete audience before them- which "can never amount to more
than floating incarnations of this universal audience" - to imagine
themselves as part of such an audience. 5 3 We can regard natural law
arguments as addressing a particular audience in their capacity as a
contingent example of a hypothesized universal audience.
A natural law argument is directed to a universal audience for whom
the actual audience- whether a jury, judge, or appellate panel- serves
as a stand-in. This is not to say that the audience is hypothesized to be
generically "rational" because reasonableness is still the hallmark of
the inquiry. Claims in this setting are tradition-bound, even as they
move beyond convention. For example, Aristotle notes that natural law
argumentation is appropriate when arguing against an accepted practice such as slavery. 54 This argument might be paraphrased as: "No
reasonable person seeking to implement the values of our legal system
could conclude that slavery is legitimate, notwithstanding our custom
and written laws to the contrary." Arguments traditionally couched in
natural law terms are not made to a timeless and decontextualized
rational being; rather, these arguments are designed to provoke the
actual audience to rise above their parochial interests and to conceive
of themselves as empowered to articulate truth, justice, and other confused notions in a manner that all members of the community should
find persuasive. Using the terminology of contemporary rhetorical
51
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criticism, we can say that natural law arguments address a particular
audience of intended readers with the goal of invoking an idealized
(universal) audience. 5 5 Natural law is not just a topic used in argumentation, then, but is an invocation of a special relationship between
speaker and audience, by calling upon the audience to live up to its
aspirations.
The most radical sense in which we can connect natural law with
Perelman's theory of argumentation is by "naturalizing rhetoric." This
is a potentially misleading term, and so I want to unpack my meaning
carefully. As used in contemporary philosophical discourse, "naturalism" refers generally to a philosophy that sees itself as clarifYing the
empirical dimensions of reality rather than engaging in speculative
metaphysics. The overriding assumption is that the only features of
reality capable of resolution by rational thinking are those that are
subject to scientific investigation. I use the term "naturalized rhetoric"
as a provocation meant to challenge such a limited notion of "nature."
The ontological claims made by Gadamer and Perelman establish that
human nature is radically hermeneutical and rhetorical, and it is this
nature that should serve as the focus of an inquiry into the natural law.
Simply put, it is our persistent human condition to continuously recreate ourselves and our society through rhetorical exchanges with others.
A naturalized rhetoric embraces the paradox that nonessentialism is
essential to our being, that we can find a foundation for reflection in
antifoundationalism.
A naturalized rhetoric regards Perelman's theory of argumentation as
an affirmative account of our reasoning nature rather than a reluctant
concession to the limitations of our ability to be thoroughly rational.
Important normative implications follow from a naturalized rhetoric. If
it is our nature to be rhetorical, an ethical system oriented toward
promoting human flourishing would require that we ensure the social
and legal context for the development of this capacity. This recoguition
would not yield specific policy prescriptions nor would it provide definitive answers to specific legal dilemmas, but it would establish the
necessity of maximizing dialogic exchanges.
By naturalizing rhetoric we can address one of the central questions
in rhetorical theory more productively: whether there is a basis for
distinguishing "good" rhetoric from ''bad" rhetoric. It is crucial to avoid
55
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the temptation to essentialize our rhetorical nature by supposing that it
includes more substantive agreement on shared norms than can be
secured in dialogue and argumentation. In other words, it is always
illegitimate to recognize our rhetorical nature but then to prescribe
certain "natural law" claims that must be accepted by all rational persons and and thus can legitimately be coercively imposed. Such ideological tendencies are closely associated with traditional natural law
claims, but it is precisely by naturalizing rhetoric that we can avoid this
misuse of the commonplace of natural law. By recognizing that it is our
nature to be rhetorical, and that the variety oflegal systems rest on this
naturalized rhetoric rather than on an objective state of affairs that can
be discerned by reason alone, we can understand how natural law
argumentation works to construct a universal audience through rhetorical engagements.

C. Reconsidering Lon Fuller's Natural Law in Rhetorical Terms
I am not writing on a blank slate, as Porter recognizes. Even the
inveterate Legal Positivist, H.L.A. Hart, recognized that human nature
provided some constraint on lawmaking, if only to the extent that there
are biological requirements for human survival. However, Porter
argues that more robust efforts to preserve the natural law tradition
against the positivist orientation have failed, and she particularly notes
that Lon Fuller's "internal morality of law" was "underdeveloped"
56
because it was limited to procedural elements. She argues that we
should deepen Fuller's insight that formal lawmaking authority
appears to have naturally emerged in society by focusing on the purposes of this contingent, yet nearly universal, development of modern
societies. 5 7 I contend that Porter has missed the depth of Fuller's natural law thinking, and that his approach is in sync with the rhetorical
and hermeneutical ontology that I have described.
Fuller clearly was a natural law philosopher who embraced the tradition of discovering natural patterns of order that provide guidance to in
situations calling for judgment. 58 At the same time, Fuller rejected the
claim to have discovered human goods according to a transcendent
standard. 59 As he later explained with reference to his early book, "The
56
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Law in Quest of Itself," Fuller advocated "not a system of natural law
but the natural-law method." 60 He argued that reasoned discovery was
possible in the moral realm, but he was equally adamant that it was
beyond the capacity of reason to elaborate the full detail of moral obligations. Fuller was not merely a proceduralist; his natural law method
attempted to steer a course between the extreme skepticism of positivist cultural relativism and the imperious dictates of moral absolutism
too often associated with theological accounts of natural law. His hopes
for the shifting intellectual tide in the late 1960s capture his mediative
efforts.
In the reorientation that seems to be taking place, one hopes that there will develop
a little more tolerance for, and interest in, the great tradition embodied in the
literature of natural law. One will find in this literature much foolishness and
much that is unacceptable to modern intellectual tastes; one will also find in it
practical wisdom applied to problems that may broadly be called those of social
architecture. 5 1

Fuller presciently sought to articulate a scholarly program for investigating the natural laws of social dynamics - a program he termed
"eunomics" - without relapsing to the comforting but misguided project
of developing a comprehensive natural law system of substantive moral
principles.
Fuller distinguished the inner morality oflaw from substantive principles, but he did not draw a sharp distinction. Rather, his claim was
that the inter-penetration of efficacious means and desired ends results
from man's social nature. In response to his critics, Fuller described law
as a relational rather than as an anonymous institution, and declared
that it is this reciprocal relationship that inspires and demands the
citizen's fidelity to law. Morality is only possible within certain social
structures and cultural settings, and the morality of law inheres precisely in its valuable contributions to shaping the context that gives rise
to correlative moral obligations of legislators, judges, and lawyers to
maximize this state of affairs.
Appreciating the degree of complexity and nuance in Fuller's account,
we can see that he did not claim to maintain strict neutrality toward
ends that extend beyond his desiderata of procedural principles oflegality. In his final reply to the persistent criticisms of The Morality of Law,
60 LoN
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1981); see also LoN L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF 103-04 (1940).
61
LoN L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY oF LAw 241 (1969).

oF

HERMENEUTICAL AND RHETORICAL NATURE

243

Fuller readily concedes that there is a substantive core to his natural
law philosophy in the form of two commitments that simultaneously
are constitutive of, and predicated on, law. First, the inner morality of
law is premised on the view "that man is, or can become, a responsible
agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and answerable
for his defaults." 62 This substantive commitment embodies nothing
more than an affirmation of the reality of morality and a rejection of
the behavioral-modifi cation/coercion theory oflaw and his adoption of a
model of tacit reciprocity. More interesting is Fuller's claim that the
inner morality of law is premised on man's nature as a communicative
being. 63 In contrast to Hart's grudging concession that a core natural
law principle might be located in man's struggle to survive the physical
conditions of scarcity and violence, Fuller argues that the moral commitments generated by communicative exchanges between moral
beings extend beyond, and sometimes override, the biological imperative to survive. 64
Communication is something more than a means of staying alive. It is a way of
being alive . ... In the words of Wittgenstein, "The limits of my language are the
limits of my world."
If I were asked, then, to discern one central indisputable principle of what may
be called substantive natural law - Natural Law with capital letters - I would
find it in the injunction: Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the
channels of communication by which men convey to one another what they
perceive, feel, and desire. In this matter th~ morality of aspiration offers more
than good counsel and the challenge of excellence. It here speaks with the
imperious voice we are accustomed to hear from the morality of duty. And if
men will listen, that voice, unlike that of the morality of duty, can be heard
across the boundaries and through the barriers that now separate men from one
another. 65

With the principle of open communication between moral beings as a
normative underpinning, it is best to view Fuller's "tacit cooperation"
thesis as a practical condition of social life that is essential to the ongoing practices of a good and workable legal system.
Fuller's natural law development of an "internal morality of law" is
premised on the unavoidable use of practical reasoning within various
institutional settings to develop substantive goals, rather than on elucidating pre-given ends. In the end, Fuller's work is an attempt to
62
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specify different institutionalized forms of discourse that contribute to
the free and open dialogue from which meaningful substantive aims
may emerge:
Indeed, at the skeptical extreme, Fuller's view is that the only adequate idea of the
common good is that legislators should enhance the effective agency of citizens,
that is, provide opportunities for them to collaborate with one another by means of
other mechanisms. In the absence of shared ends, official must respect the integrity
of emergent efforts at cooperation in local settings. 66

This should not be regarded as a skeptical extreme; rather this position
should be embraced as the facilitation of man's human nature as a
social being who builds his society through hermeneutical and rhetorical engagement with others. This is the abiding lesson of Fuller's
famous hypothetical case of the Speluncean Explorers, in which the
judges engage is a dialogic clash of competing opinions in the face of an
underdetermined clash of moral and legal values. 67
Fuller's natural law philosophy can be understood fully only by recognizing his largely implicit commitments to substantive principles of
justice that have generally been overlooked. Fuller labored within the
confines of a dying debate between traditional natural law philosophy
and analytical legal positivism, but he anticipated the work of contemporary theorists who draw on sophisticated accounts of the connections
between man's nature as a communicative social being and the operation of legal institutions. 68 Philosophical hermeneutics and rhetorical
theory provide the conceptual resources necessary to appreciate and
extend Fuller's important insights. It is precisely this tack I wish to
take in deepening and broadening Porter's natural law account of legal
authority.

3. Expanding and Deepening Porter's Natural Law Account:
The Hermeneutical and Rhetorical Nature of Law
In this part of the article I reinforce Porter's effort to provide a
theological justification of an independent, secular legal system by
66
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elaborating how such a legal system relates to the natural law. Once we
acknowledge that human nature is hermeneutical and rhetorical, the
relationship between the natural law and the legal system can be
understood with greater depth and nuance. The human goods traditionally identified by natural law theorists do not arise directly from the
biological constitution of the human species, but instead reflect
millennia of social construction through hermeneutical appropriation
and rhetorical elaboration. Returning to the seat of the human condition - that we are finite and tradition-bound beings who constantly
exercise free will through the unavoidable processes of non-deductive
interpretation and persuasion- provides a more persuasive argument
in favor of the rule of law in constitutional democracies. Of course, I
acknowledge that this is a judgment no less subject to argumentation
and to reassessment in the face of developments in the human condition
than any other natural law claim.
Justifying a legal system that is independent of the speculative efforts
by diverse religions to define the nature of human goods through theological reflection begins with the recognition that it is human nature
to innovate constantly and to reshape the social structures within
which humans can flourish. This relates to one of Porter's most important insights: the legal system is not just a concession to the reality of
original sin (by providing punishment for wrongdoing), it is a social
institution that provides the positive means for the development and
expression of human capacities. 69 Porter explains that law is not merely
ameliorative,
[it] provides in addition something that cannot be supplied in any other way. That is,
it offers institutional forms and structures through which men and women can actually practice the political virtues, through publicly sanctioned individual activities
and through participation in shared activities and practices. Without these institutional forms, individuals could of course still promote the common good through all
kinds of private contributions to public utility. But they could not act specifically as
citizens of a polity, because they would have no way in which to carry out publicly
recognized and sanctioned legal actions, nor could they participate in activities which
70
by their nature require the coordinated activities of many individuals.

For example, we may compare a sophisticated and coordinated system of
social welfare benefits with a strictly libertarian system that relies solely
on individual charitable donations to those in need. The latter is politically anemic because it does not expressly acknowledge the priority of
the social realm in sustaining all individual freedoms. A coordinated
69
70
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political and legal system of rights and obligations is not a constraint on
individual human freedom; to the contrary, it provides the context that
enables the development of individual human capacities.
One cannot understand a text without a horizon of preunderstandings, nor can one persuade another without drawing on shared
to poi. Similarly, the expressive role of the social institutions created by
law is a precondition in the modern world for the exercise of human
freedom. The libertarian ideology itself rests on certain expressive features of modern constitutional democracies regarding individual rights,
as well as an intricate system of property entitlements created through
the "common" law. The claim that this form of social authority is "natural" and that other assertions of social authority are not natural is not
an argument; rather, it is the topic sentence for an argument that must
be elaborated and which already concedes the primacy of the social
structures within which individuals acquire their attributes and
express their freedom.
The theological lesson that we derive from our hermeneuticalrhetorical situation is the radical nature of free will, and the corresponding obligation to facilitate its sound exercise. Theologians ask
how we can persist in the drama of human life with nothing but human
life to sustain us, but ifthere is a God she stands mute in the face of this
question, prodding us to answer it ourselves. We must find within our
human practices the resources to continue those practices with integrity, true to our nature as meaning-making beings. Aristotle provided
guidance, as did the early Scholastics, but this wisdom has been overcome by the fool's errand to secure indubitable truths by which to guide
our behavior. Perhaps ironically, it is only by acknowledging the all-toohuman hermeneutical and rhetorical foundations of our social practices
that we can catch a glimpse of the radical finitude of our striving, and
thereby appreciate the mystery that is God. Theologians argue that the
eternal law secures these practices, but the eternal law does not guide
us in the day-to-day practice oflaw and politics. In these circumstances,
we can refer only to the natural law that can be perceived by all persons- believers and non-believers alike- because it is the touchstone of
the human experience rather than a metaphysical claim. John Finnis's
"new natural law" fails because it is Catholic orthodoxy masquerading
as the operation of practical rationality that compels all persons
to accept certain conclusions. 71 In contrast, the natural law cannot
71

Porter demonstrates that Finnis fails in his project to ground specific moral prescriptions in reason alone. Her natural law account is best viewed as a response to the
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plausibly be premised on the dictates of rationality because it may be
brought to bear on questions of social organization only through efforts
to identify and choose between reasonable alternatives.
Porter emphasizes that the lack of a rationally compelling answer to
social questions, and thus the inevitability of deliberation, reveals that
it is human nature under discussion. Our deliberation is about something that is real even if it is contingent, dynamic and contextual. She
recognizes "that deliberative processes presuppose some overall conception of what it means to live a good human life," and that this ideal will
be articulated "through processes of assessment and reform of our
major social conventions" as a prerequisite for our ability "to continue
deliberating in a principled, reasonable way."72 Theological reflection
adds an important qualification that accentuates our nature: we must
resist the authoritarian urge to specify in advance the outcome of deliberative discourse because we have access only to the natural law, not to
the eternal law.
Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy and Perelman's rhetorical philosophy are united in opposing authoritarian claims precisely because
such claims run counter to our human nature as finite and social beings.
Gadamer argues that interpretation is possible because there is an
underlying shared agreement embodied in a tradition, but he emphasizes that the fusion of horizons is never complete and that the tradition
is dynamic. This le?ds him to conclude that there is a sharp distinction
between authority in interpretation, and authoritarianism. Similarly,
Perelman recognizes that important rhetorical claims are made to the
universal audience, but he rejects the idea that an actual audience has
the attributes of a universal audience, or that we can short-circuit dialogue and specifY what the universal audience would conclude about a
given matter. In short, both thinkers provide detailed examinations of
our human nature in a manner that supports Porter's claims that we
must engage in dialogue to resolve the contours of social authority.
The primary goal of Ministers of the Law is to locate the source of
authority for law and thereby to legitimate the exercise of power. Porter's natural law account properly emphasizes that authority is a social
reality and she rejects the suggestion that authority amounts to an
individual choice to submit to another's will or derives from a social
contract that individuals enter to promote their collective well-being.
However, she does not press this point to its fullest extent by
72
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rejecting entirely the idea that authority depends on the pedigree of a
pronouncement and recognizing that authority is continually earned
only in dynamic social practices. Porter provides a careful and sophisticated analysis of Joseph Raz's attempt to discover how authority can be
legitimate when each individual has the moral obligation to act rationally in all circumstances, but Raz's claim that it is irrational to adhere
to authority when it deviates from rationality misses the crucial insight
that rationality is not at issue in these matters. Rather, it is a question
of accepting a reasonable resolution of an underdetermined question.
We may - and in some cases, must - reject authority, but only if the
authoritative pronouncement is not in accord with one of the many
reasonable solutions to the question presented. The space between personal beliefs and authoritative pronouncements inevitably results from
the lack of a single rational solution to most questions that arise in
society, and the need for dialogic determinations of reasonable courses
of action that combine to provide the framework that enables individual
flourishing.
Porter acknowledges the priority of the social realm for moral
decisionmaking and refers specifically to the necessity for rhetorical
efforts of persuasion, and so her position is conducive to the ontological
reading that I propose. This is the wisdom we have inherited from
Aristotle: man is a social animal who lives through communal structures and institutions that provide the very possibility for individuals to
participate in the virtues. 73 Hermeneutical understanding is an effort
to identifY unproductive prejudices in the course of understanding
another person or a text, but this is not to pretend that we can rise
above the socially-constituted prejudices that form our preunderstanding. Rhetorical claims can be inventive uses of cultural topoi to
effect a change in understanding, but the topoi that make this possible
cannot be brought into question wholesale. Understanding and critique
are possible only because we work within a broad social framework of
preunderstandings and agreement. Porter accepts this point, in a quotation that bears repeating. Without "the coherence provided by a culture, with its limitations and possibilities, we could not even begin the
74
reflective processes necessary to [cultural] critique."
Porter's analysis lends itself to my argument that human nature is
hermeneutical and rhetorical, but she doesn't fully embrace the fundamental significance of this point. Porter argues that Lon Fuller offers

73

74

Id. at 143.
Id. at 164.

HERMENEUTICAL AND RHETORICAL NATURE

249

only a proceduralist account of natural law that cannot establish the
authority oflegal procedures, but this reading of Fuller ignores his late
recognition that his procedural desiderata were shaped by, and responsive to, man's hermeneutical and rhetorical nature. As related above,
Fuller acknowledged that the procedural desiderata that comprise the
internal morality oflaw were the means by which we facilitate rhetorical knowledge in society by opening up communication and sponsoring
transparent decisionmaking when there is no rationally-compelled
answer. This is not a strategic decision to achieve other, pre-determined
ends, but instead is an acknowledgment of the core of human nature.
The hermeneutical philosopher, P. Christopher Smith, emphasizes
this point by revising the Cartesian dictum that set the stage for the
Enlightenment worldview. Smith has undermined this conceit in a
forceful manner, emphasizing that "we never think in wordless ideas,
but only in the words we have first heard from others and then hear
again in our thinking. "75 He explains:
In other words, language, audible speech, is not invented by private individuals to
signifY thoughts they already have but is the gift ofthe community that allows the
individual to think in the first place. Not cogito ergo sum ["I think, therefore I am"]
is the truth of the matter, rather loquimur ergo cogito [''We speak, therefore I
think"]. 76

Thinking is the residue of our deliberations with others, which is how
we come to have a world. Political and legal structures must attend to
this core of our nature if they are to be legitimate.
This point has important consequences for Porter's account of law's
legitimacy. If we recognize that human nature is hermeneutical and
rhetorical, it follows that law's legitimacy is secured only to the extent
that it is responsive to this nature, rather than by virtue of its pedigree.
Porter embraces intentionalism as the ground of legal meaning because
this approach reaches back to the moment that legitimate authority is
exercised by the lawgiver, but this focus on original intent is misguided
because it is simply implausible. The authority and legitimacy of the
legal system is secured by the character of the hermeneutical-rhetorical
practices in which legal actors exercise power, and not by supposing
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that legal actors can retrieve original intentions of persons who have
legitimacy as lawgivers.
Porter argues that the intention of the legitimate lawgiver is an abiding source of authority that must be recuperated by the judge in her
interpretation of the law. 77 Her target is the "new textualist" attempt to
render the meaning of law objective by looking to the original understanding of semantic meaning, which she correctly criticizes as an effort
78
to deny the purposiveness at the heart of natural law principles.
However, Porter errs by embracing intentionalism, going so far as to
conclude that "to some extent, and with all due caution, the judge must
function as a kind of historian." 79 This fundamental mistake runs contrary to Porter's otherwise careful account, and could be avoided by
embracing a naturalized rhetoric.
Porter acknowledges that legitimate legal rules must be specified
through communal rhetorical processes and cannot be deduced from
natural law principles, and this recognition implies that legal authority
does not have a stagnant, ahistorical quality. First, she is careful not to
completely separate the functions of judge and legislator, acknowledging "a necessary complementarity" relationship between their roles
because they both simultaneously are creative architects and ministers
of the law. 80 When she argues that the judge must be more subordinate
to the lawgiving, acting as a kind of historian, she does so only with
ample qualification. The judge is obligated to recuperate the original
intention of the lawgiver, but only by providing a "plausible construal of
the trajectory set by the reception of the original law" in full recognition
that there is no pure original intent, but rather a "fuller meaning" that
unfolds historically "through the processes of reception and development that are integral to the life of the law."81 She is not a simplistic
intentionalist, although her attack on new textualism leads her too
readily to embrace the intentionalist perspective.
We can illuminate Porter's subtle understanding by carefully considering a key paragraph relating her conception oflegal authority.
This implies that the laws and legal institutions of a particular society are genuinely authoritative because, and only to the extent that, they serve the general
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purposes of law in the concrete circumstances of a particular community. More
specifically, the legitimacy of these enactments and institutions depends most fundamentally on their character as public expressions and embodiments of a society's
key values, the common objects of love holding it together as a society. Secondarily
their legitimacy rests on their effective functioning in serving the complex of natural and ameliorative purposes that can best or only be served by the rule of law,
including especially the critical ameliorative purposes of securing public peace and
protecting the members of the community from those who would otherwise do them
harm. Of course, the laws must serve these functions, and must be seen to serve
them, in order to preserve the minimal level of acceptance necessary for their
effectiveness. But more fundamentally, on the account of authority being developed
here, the laws derive their normative force, their status as norms that ought to be
followed, from the fact that they are rationally defensible public expressions of the
values and mores of a given society, which additionally serve the secondary but
critically important functions just noted. 82

This passage elegantly captures the reality of legal authority precisely
because it acknowledges that authority is an ongoing articulation of
values by a community and not an authoritative command frozen ill
time and applied ministerially by functionary judges. Authority is
lodged in the law, which has meaning only ill its ongoing judicial application and legislative supplementation, and it cannot be attributed to
the intentions of any particular actor at a particular point in time.
The fiction that we can recuperate the original illtentions of the legislature as the basis for rule of law governance is thoroughly discredited
by contemporary hermeneutical and rhetorical theorists. We should
employ Porter's broader arguments against her specific conclusion that
we should adopt an intentionalist approach to legal interpretation and
authority. Accepting a naturalized rhetoric at the heart oflegal practice
clarifies that legal authority results from the response to persistent
challenges that call for an articulation of the broad aspects of human
nature within the parameters of an existing social setting with its own
institutional history. Legal authority is gained when the processes of
law are attentive to our hermeneutical and rhetorical nature.
Another way in which Porter's account should be modified as part of
a naturalized rhetoric is to embrace the possibility of a global legal
culture emerging out of the current age of nation-states. Porter is
correct to emphasize that a naive appeal to "human nature" as a source
of regulatory principles that are untethered to a specific social, economic and legal community risks the fragile accomplishments of the
constitutional democracies to connect legal regulation with human
nature, a historical achievement that unfolded as part of the modern
82
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nation-state era. She contends that our connnon humanity provides an
insufficient basis to ground a global legal order, arguing that we abandon the historical trajectory of the nation state, with its attendant
83
traditions and institutional developments, at our peril. Her targets
are theological critiques of the nation state for inhibiting the experience
84
of our common humanity as God's children. I join in her rejection of a
naive disregard of the positive nature of the socially constructed features of constitutional democracies within a system of nation states
that have facilitated human flourishing. This aspect of Porter's argument is, in fact, another manifestation of her careful refusal to flatten
natural law thinking to a rationalistic enterprise. She skillfully focuses
on the contextual specification of natural law principles within certain
communities that are defined by institutions and cultural practices that
85
necessarily are contingent rather than essential.
Nevertheless, by adopting a naturalized rhetoric we can reinforce
Porter's wisdom without devaluing the possibilities of a nascent global
rhetorical culture grounded in natural law. It pays to recall that Chai:m
Perelman participated in the drafting ofthe Declaration of the Rights of
Man in response to the Nazi horrors, and that the Nuremberg trials
were grounded in similar claims. It was the catastrophic failure of the
nation-states to protect human rights during the twentieth century
that spurred these rhetorical innovations that now are manifested in
international criminal tribunals and courts. The European Union is a
potential successor to the nation-state system of Western Europe, and it
Although I accept the force of her argument in the context in which it is made, it
does bear emphasis that there is a community of beings who must consciously face
mortality, and it is a mistake to bypass too quickly the notion of shared humanity. See,
e.g., ALPHONSO LINGIS, THE CoMMUNITY OF THOSE WHO HAVE NoTHING IN CoMMON (1994).
Lingis cautions that the delicate achievements noted by Porter can too often mislead us
into accepting the socially constructed world as the entirety of the world, rendering us
oblivious to those who are not part of this rational body. "In our system oflaws and our
social institutions, we recognize our formulated experience, our judgment, our debated
consensuses. In our rational collective enterprises we find, in principle, nothing alien to
us, foreign, and impervious to our understanding; we find only ourselves." !d. at 6.
84
See PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAw, supra note 1, at 310-12 (critiquing Niebuhr's
thesis that the nation state is emblematic of our fallenness).
85
Porter emphasizes that the nation-state is not per se legitimate, and that it is
legitimate only insofar as rhetorical processes of persuasion tether the government to
83
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the members of the community. There is really no such thing as a properly unconditional
authority; the pretension to absolute power is a mark of tyranny, and as such it exercises no
proper normative force over its putative subjects.
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already has had powerful effects on economics, politics and human
rights. By adopting a naturalized rhetoric we can chart the potential
for the rhetorical tethering of global and multi-state initiatives to purposive human nature. For example, the EU has advanced fundamental
human rights through the work of the Court of Justice of the European
Union, which has facilitated the development of human rights discourse outside the strict nation-state framework (even though it is
implemented through existing nation-states).
Admittedly, the example of the EU might also be used to confirm
Porter's emphasis on the importance of the nation-state as the context
in which human rights may flourish. Significant portions of the population are wary of the EU precisely because it lacks the democratic legitimacy provided by a constitutional democracy, and the long-term
success of the EU may be contingent on its emergence as a federal
system that assumes nation -state status just as the federal government
in the United States did early in our country's history. 86 Nevertheless,
the tension between the nation-state regime of world governance and
alternatives presented by developments such as the EU indicates that
we should pay attention to the rhetorical structures of the EU as potential sources for explicating the natural law. Moreover, there are supranational institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and
non-governmental organizations addressing endemic global problems
such as human trafficking, the plight of refugees, and the spread of
AlDS that seek to implement the natural law in ways that are not
limited to the formal governance structures of the nation states. Porter
recognizes these possibilities, 87 but she focuses too much on the less
tangible efforts to develop an effective "international law" than on
quasi-governmental bodies such as the EU, or non-governmental
efforts, both of which are developing rich discourses.

4. Conclusion: The Hermeneutical and Rhetorical
Nature of Law
Jean Porter has written an important book that reinvigorates the
natural law approach to legal authority. My qualifications and extensions of her argument are offered as friendly amendments, as I endorse
86

My colleague, Marketa Trimble, helpfully made this observation.
Porter admits that rhetoric regarding our common humanity may be appropriate
in certain contexts, and that the era of the nation-state may be ending. See PoRTER,
MINISTERS OF THE LAw, supra note 1, at 296, 304. I am suggesting that a naturalized
rhetoric provides us with the best means to recognize what has already happened and
to chart the course for productive developments in the future.
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her approach. In this article I have argued that we gain clarification by
regarding human nature as hermeneutical and rhetorical, and utilizing
contemporary hermeneutical philosophy and rhetorical theory to elucidate the nature of human flourishing. AB Porter insists, there is no
determinate ground that will generate unique conclusions to moral,
political and social dilemmas. The eternal law may vouchsafe the
human condition, but humans do not have access to it. A naturalized
rhetoric provides the means for exploring natural law in the manner
suggested by Porter: with sensitivity to context, history and human
finitude. Legal scholars owe a great debt to Porter for advancing a
conversation that has occurred over several millennia, renewing the
natural law tradition in light of our contemporary challenges and
current resources.

